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From Brownsville, take Route 4 (Boca Chica Road) about 20.3 miles east to Boca Ricia Beach
(on roadside).
Marker Text: These Palmetto piling are the remains of the Boca Chica Crossing of the Railroad from Boca
Chica inlet to White's Ranch on the Rio Grande. Begun by General Francis H. Herron,
U.S.A., in 1864 and completed in 1865 by General Philip H. Sheridan for the transportation
of military supplies. The Cypress piling 1,000 feet north are what remain of a floating bridge
constructed across Boca Chica Inlet by General Zachary Taylor in 1846 as a part of the road
from Brazos Santiago to the White Ranch Landing and Clarksville on the Rio Grande, for
transportation of military supplies.
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Name: Palmito Ranch Battlefield
Address: Between TX 4 (Boca Chica Hwy.) and the Rio Grande, approximately 12 mi. E of Brownsville
County: Cameron
City: Brownsville
Narrative: Palmito Ranch Battlefield lies on a windswept plain at the southernmost tip of Texas, midway
between Brazos Island and Brownsville, on sparse land characterized by marsh and chaparral
with a few scattered hillocks (See Photographs 1 through 5). The name of the area comes from
the Palmetto trees that dot the landscape wherever the terrain rises a few feet above sea level.
Mid 19th century artifacts can be found at the remains of early ranches and railroad camps. The
south boundary of the battlefield follows the current course of the Rio Grande River, while the
Highway 4 (Boca Chica Highway) marks the north boundary. The west boundary roughly
follows a line extending southward from Loma del Muerto to the Rio Grande, and the east
boundary roughly follows a line extending southward from the westernmost tip of Verdolaga
Lake to a point on the Rio Grande midway between Tarpon Bend and Stell-Lind Banco No. 128.
(See the accompanying map for a thorough depiction of the battlefield area.) The area is subject
to frequent hurricanes and squalls. Only a few permanent buildings are at the periphery of the
battlefield, primarily in the vicinity of Palmito Hill. Since this portion of south Texas has not been
subjected to much development, the battlefield remains reliably unchanged, and thus retains its
integrity to a high degree.
Of the major geographic locations associated with the battle of Palmito Ranch-the battlefield,
Fort Brown, Brazos Santiago, Matamoros, and Baghdad-only the battlefield itself remains
reliably unaltered since the battle. Baghdad is now gone, and only the archeological features
from Brazos Santiago depot remain, while Brownsville has grown to engulf Fort Brown and
Matamoros has continued to grow. The lack of extensive development at the battlefield is due
mainly to the unstable nature of both the topography and the climate. The battlefield lies on a
somewhat barren plain, where the only vegetation consists of marsh plants and chaparral. The
area's name is derived from the small Palmetto trees that appear wherever the landscape rises a
few feet above sea level (see Photograph 1). The climate is harsh and unpredictable, with
extremely wet, stormy winters and hot, humid summers. As well the soil is unsuitable for
extensive farming, grazing, or building development, and thus the battlefield remains
remarkably similar in character the way it appeared at the time of the battle. The only significant
difference is the course of the Rio Grande, which continued to alter its path during the almost
110 years since the time of the battle.
The battlefield lies approximately midway between Brazos Island, a Union Army base of
operations during the Civil War, and Fort Brown at Brownsville, the Confederate's headquarters
in South Texas (See Figure 1). As the Union troops marched towards Brownsville, they
encountered Confederate outposts in the areas of White's Ranch and Palmito Ranch, and this
initial resistance determined the placement of the battle. Later in the fighting, the Confederates
launched their counterattack in the same vicinity, before driving the Union troops back towards
Brazos Island. The most concentrated fighting took place in the area nominated as Palmito Ranch
Battlefield. Small hillocks, or lomas, currently dot the battlefield area, and were present at the
time of the conflict. These small increases in elevation, none of which rise more than thirty feet
above sea level, were important to both armies. The dense thickets that grew on the hillsides
provided for surveillance and cover.
According to eyewitness accounts of the battle, a few ranch houses and auxiliary buildings were
scattered throughout the area at the time of the fighting. Praxides Orive, for example, an ancestor
of the family that still owns much of the battlefield land, recalled first hearing the sounds of
battle from his family's ranch house and barnyard on Palmito Ranch. Later that afternoon,
according to Orive, the Union troops burned the ranch house as they passed through the area.
The exact location of the house remains unknown.
The only remaining historic properties in the battlefield area are ruins, including the concrete
steps, brick piers, and concrete foundation of a dwelling, probably constructed around 1920, and
the adjoining ruins of a small concrete outbuilding. Both are atop Palmito Hill on property the
same Orive family owned. This is considered a Noncontributing site until comprehensive survey
and research is complete.
Within Palmito Ranch battlefield (41CF93) are a number of Civil War era ranch sites, including
Tulosa Ranch, Palmito Ranch, White's Ranch, and Cobb's Ranch. Based on a surface examination
of the ranch sites by the Department of Antiquities Protection of the Texas Historical
Commission, and information provided by Charles Morris (an avocational archeologist and
metal detector user), preserved archeological deposits in each of these areas relate to the
settlement of the Lower Rio Grande valley. The types of artifacts observed on the ranching sites
include such items as English, American, and Mexican ceramics and bottles, nails, metal tools,
and handmade bricks, along with evidence of structural remains at Tulosa Ranch. These ranch
sites are considered Noncontributing because comprehensive survey and research remains
incomplete.
The Civil War Union railroad camp is also preserved near Cobb's Ranch. Metal detecting has
recovered nails, spikes, and other railroad equipment, along with military artifacts such as
buttons, canteens, and tools. This site is considered Contributing as it pertains directly to the
battle and has been documented in a survey report prepared by Espey, Huston and Associates
for the Corps of Engineers.
Military artifacts from the 1864 and 1865 engagements at Palmito Ranch that local landowners
and recent metal detecting activities found are within the boundaries of the battlefield. Artifacts
include bullets and shot, cannonballs, and metal buttons from uniforms. The distribution of these
types of artifacts across the battlefield remains unknown at present; however, based on
reconnaissance survey by the aforementioned Texas Historical Commission archeologists, the
profusion of these artifacts warrants that the entire area be considered a Contributing site.
Limited contemporary construction has taken place within the boundaries of Palmito Ranch
Battlefield. Recent construction within the area include a trailer park (a Noncontributing site), a
gasoline station (a Noncontributing building), and approximately ten single family dwellings (all
Noncontributing buildings).
Due to the overall lack of development in the area, Palmito Ranch Battlefield retains its integrity
of location, setting, feeling, and association. The land's virtually unchanged physical features still
convey the battlefield's appearance during the Civil War.
Palmito Ranch Battlefield is nominated to the National Register at the national level of
significance under Criteria A and D for its importance as the site of the last land engagement
fought during the Civil War. Although actually occurring more than one month after
Confederate General Robert E. Lee surrendered to Union leader General Ulysses S. Grant at
Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia, in April 1865, the Battle of Palmito Ranch represented the
ongoing conflict between the Confederacy's Trans-Mississippi Department and the Union Army.
The battle, fought May 12 and 13, 1865, took place on a broad expanse of land halfway between
Brownsville and Brazos Island (See Figure 1). This approximately five-mile stretch of land is
Palmito Ranch Battlefield. Union Colonel Theodore H. Barrett, commander of the U.S. forces
stationed at Brazos Santiago, instigated the battle on May 11, 1865, when he ordered an
expedition of Union troops to cross onto the mainland and march in the direction of Fort Brown.
These troops skirmished with increasing numbers of Confederates during the next two days,
although the total number of Confederates was always well below the number of Union troops.
Finally, on the afternoon of May 13, 1865, the Confederate Army, under the command of Colonel
John S. (Rip) Ford, launched a spirited, two-pronged counterattack that eventually drove the
Union troops back to Brazas Island. The center of the confederacy's lucrative, secret cotton
shipping operation, the Lower Rio Grande region was of great strategic importance to the
Confederacy during the Civil War. Through Brownsville and the Rio Grande the Confederacy
secretly exported its cotton to Mexico and, eventually, to European textile mills. profits financed
the Confederate government. Recognizing the significance of this cotton trade to the viability of
the Confederacy, the Union made repeated attempts during the war to seize control of South
Texas. The Battle of Palmito Ranch, which the Confederates won, was not only the Union's last,
unsuccessful attempt to seize control of this region; it was also the last battle associated with the
American Civil War, a most turbulent and divisive period in United States history.
The Civil War in Texas
Texas seceded from the United States on February 1, 1861, under the authority of an ordinance
the newly created Secession Convention passed, and which a popular vote confirmed on
February 23. In that vote, the majority of the citizens of the state expressed support for secession.
Among the first six states to leave the Union, all of which were major cotton producers, Texas
officially joined the Confederate States of America in early March 1861. Soon after the formal
transition, Major General D.E. Twiggs, commander of the Union military forces in Texas,
surrendered all Federal military supplies and posts in the state to Texas Ranger Ben McCullough,
an agent for the state. The Confederacy held those Union troops not yet evacuated from the state
and commandeered Union forts (Webb 1952:351).
Texas' decision to secede was essentially a declaration of war against the Union, and the state
immediately began assembling troops for military action. A volunteer army was supplemented
through a variety of state and Confederate legislative conscription acts issued from 1862 through
1864. The number of Texans involved in military service during the Civil War remains unclear,
although one conservative estimate of the number of Texans in the Confederate Army is between
50,000 and 60,000. Of this total, approximately one quarter served east of the Mississippi River,
while the rest were stationed in Arkansas, Louisiana, and along the Texas coast and frontier. Not
all eligible Texas men reported to the Confederacy for duty; a small fraction (approximately
2,000) were Union sympathizers, most of whom went north to join the Union Army (including
the Second Texas Cavalry, who later fought in the Battle of Palmito Ranch). Other Unionists fled
to the hills or the forest to avoid military service, while some joined the Confederate Army only
to later become deserters (Webb 1952:351).
At the start of the Civil War, the Texas forces initiated several offensive maneuvers, principally
in the New Mexico Territory just west of Texas. In 1862, for example, General H.H. Sibley led a
force of Texas troops in the successful capture of Santa Fe and Albuquerque for the Confederacy.
Most of these offensive engagements, however, were relatively minor events in the overall
military campaigns of the Civil War.
A much more important aspect of Confederate military strategy in Texas was the defense of its
borders and ports from Federal attack. In 1863, Union troops stormed Sabine Pass with a massive
array of force including more than 5,000 men and four gunboats. But Confederate soldiers, under
the command of Lieutenant Richard Dowling, repelled the invasion (Webb 1952:351). Most
Union initiatives concentrated on Texas ports, since the ports were major sources of income for
the Confederacy. For instance, the Union took Galveston in 1862. In November of 1863, an
invasion force of more than 6,000 Federal troops, the largest yet to invade the state, descended on
South Texas and was so successful in securing Brownsville and other points in the Rio Grande
Valley that by January 1, 1864, the Union effectively controlled the entire Texas coast from the
mouth of the Rio Grande to the Matagorda Peninsula.
By 1864, however, the Confederates began rebuilding their strength in South Texas. Colonel John
S. (Rip) Ford (1815-1897), who later played a decisive role in the Confederacy's defeat of union
troops at the Battle of Palmito Ranch, recaptured Brownsville on July 30, 1864. By the middle of
August 1864, Union soldiers abandoned almost all posts in the Rio Grande area and along the
Gulf Coast, presumably to concentrate their military strength in states to the east. In Texas, they
remained only at Matagorda Peninsula, an island separating Matagorda Bay from the Gulf of
Mexico, and at Brazos Santiago Depot, on the north tip of Brazos Island (See Figure 1). Following
the Union withdrawals, the Confederacy controlled all of South Texas except for these two
coastal bases. Except for minor, scattered skirmishes, the two armies essentially ceased fighting
in Texas by that time, as it became increasingly apparent to both parties that further conflict in
the state would do little to change the ultimate outcome of the Civil War.
Cotton Smuggling on the Rio Grande
Of all the Texas coastal regions threatened during the war, the Rio Grande Valley region was the
most significant area of military conflict, due to, its strategic location near both the Rio Grande-
an international border - and the Gulf of Mexico. Access to ports was vitally important to the
Confederacy during the Civil War, since the transatlantic shipment of cotton provided essential
financing for their government and war effort. As one chronicler of the war notes, "To an
economist the history of the Confederate States centers about the government's attempts to
secure the material means with which to carry on the war. The wealth of the South consisted
chiefly of land and slaves, and its industries were almost exclusively agricultural" (Schwab
1901:2). The South's "material means" to finance a war effort was cotton-the basis of its plantation
economy.
At the start of the war, the Confederacy withheld cotton from European textile mills -the main
importers of Confederate cotton-in hopes that this might drive European governments to
pressure the Union into allowing the Confederacy independence. As the war dragged on,
however, the leaders of the Confederacy realized that withholding cotton deprived their
fledgling government of vital currency (Schuler 1960: 11). Union intelligence recognized the
importance of Texas ports to both the export of Confederate cotton and the import of medical
and military supplies, and had established a blockade around most southern ports, effectively
sealing off Texas "from the balance of the world" (Ford 1963:328). The Confederacy had to devise
a way to circumvent this barrier if it wished to export cotton.
Confederate cotton farmers used different methods to slip through the blockade depending on
their location. Farmers east of the Mississippi River relied on government for smuggling
attempts. One historian notes:
Planters in deep southeastern states were cut away from markets by the blockade. These planters
sold their cotton, for there was no other outlet, to Confederate government cotton agents, and
were paid, because there was no other money, in a Confederate currency which constantly
depreciated. To dispose of the cotton thus acquired, the Confederate government fitfully
depended upon the limited and uncertain operations of maritime blockade runners (Lea
1957:190).
On the other hand, cotton farmers in Confederate states west of the Mississippi (the Trans-
Mississippi Department) were not obligated to sell their cotton to their government, and could
instead attempt to smuggle the crops themselves. Western planters quickly learned the strategic
importance of the twin cities of Brownsville and Matamoros in the trading and shipment of
Confederate cotton.
Brownsville's proximity to the border and the Gulf Coast was crucial to Confederate schemes to
evade the Union's naval barriers. The city lay across the Rio Grande from Matamoros, and
traders in the Mexican city were sympathetic, to the confederate cause, as well as to their own
economic gain. A complex, clandestine trade agreement was thus informally established between
Mexico and the Confederacy, whereby cotton from Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Missouri
was transported across the Rio Grande to Matamoros, then shipped on wagon to Baghdad,
Mexico, at the mouth of the Rio Grande. At that point, steamboats flying the Mexican flag carried
the cotton to European ships moored beyond the reef in the Gulf. Prior to the war, the privately
owned steamboats were registered in Brownsville. For the Confederate ruse to work, merchants
changed the registry of their vessels, placing them under the neutral Mexican flag and under the
command of Mexican friends. Federal forces knew of this trick, yet a challenge to the authority of
one of the "Mexican" steamboats would risk a confrontation with Mexico and possibly another
war (Schuler 1960:12). In addition to facilitating the export of cotton, the Confederate-Mexican
trade agreement enabled the import of arms and other supplies necessary for the South to
maintain an adequate defense and withstand the naval blockade.
From late 1863 to July 1864, the Union Army controlled Fort Brown in Brownsville, forcing
Confederate smugglers to sidestep the city in their efforts to transport their cotton to the Gulf.
Confederate wagons hauled numerous bales of cotton far upriver, to other locations on the
border near Laredo and Eagle Pass. "Mexican wagons (like the "Mexican" steamboats mentioned
above, these wagons flew the Mexican flag, yet Confederates operated them) then transported
the valuable cargo through the Mexican countryside to the mouth of the river. The extra miles
were costly and time consuming, giving the Confederates additional incentive to retake Fort
Brown.
Confederate Colonel John S. (Rip) Ford, who would later lead the Confederate counter attack at
the Battle of Palmito Ranch, was instrumental in negotiating with the Mexican traders.
According to Ford's memoirs, at the start of the war:
[I] visited the merchants of Matamoros, particularly those of foreign countries, and insisted upon
steps being taken at once to open trade with Europe and the Confederate States through
Matamoros....The consuls of Great Britain and Germany promised to aid in the matter, and they
did. Cotton was hauled across Texas to Matamoros where it was traded for foodstuffs and war
materiel. An immense trade opened up in a short while. Matamoros was soon crammed with
strangers and filled) with goods of every class (Ford 1963:329).
Indeed, Matamoros quickly became a thriving city filled not only with cotton speculators from
both sides' of the border, but also with "renegades and conscript dodgers" from both the Union
and the Confederacy (Schuler 1960: 11). Many of those who tried to cross the river to Mexico
dried in the attempt, but those who made it to Matamoros and Baghdad found themselves in
cities rich with fortunes accumulated from the lucrative cotton trade. The wild, boom period was
known as the "cotton times." According to one historian, "Minutes of [Cameron] County
Commission meetings [from the period] are filled with granting of liquor dispensing licenses as
well as charges of gaming and gambling" (Myers 1990:34). Baghdad's population exploded
during the boom from practically zero to between 25,000 and 30,000, while its upriver neighbor,
Matamoros, exceeded 40,000.
The flood of cotton through Matamoros was understandable, since the city became, during the
Civil War years, "Mexico's most important doorway to North America" (Horgan 1954:837).
Cotton brokers in the city paid high prices for the precious commodity during the war years. The
following table shows prices paid in "hard money" (often gold, as opposed to the Confederate
government's paper money) per pound of cotton delivered at Matamoros from the early years of
the war through its conclusion in 1865 (Lea 1957: 192):
Date Price Paid per Pd of Cotton
August 1862 16 cents Late in 1862 25 cents April 2, 1863 36 cents The year 1863 20 to 74 cents
November 1863 30 and 90 cents The year 1864 82 cents (only one price cited) The year 1865 68
cents to as high as $1.25
Unable to compete with the high prices paid in Matamoros, the Confederate government in
October 1862 "prohibited the exportation of cotton by anyone other than authorized agents of the
Confederate government" (Lea 1957:191). The order was essentially ignored, however, as western
cotton planters continued to flock to the Rio Grande. The table, which shows increasing number
of ships anchored off the Baghdad coast over the course of the Civil War, demonstrates the
continuing market for cotton (Lea 1957:192).
Date Number of ships
September 1862 20 March 1863 60 to 70 March 1863 92 Late 1864/Early 1865 200 to 300
These tables demonstrate not only continued popularity of the Brownsville/Matamoros cotton
trade (even in the face of the Confederate law banning such activity), but also large amounts of
money Confederates stood to make as a result of the secret route.
Colonel Ford played an integral role not only in establishing the clandestine South Texas trade
route, but also in cloaking it from the Union and protecting those who used it. He regarded his
role as a military commander in the Rio Grande Valley as twofold: first, his troops were to
defend the area against Union military attacks, and second, they were to oversee the delicate
trade relationship he helped establish between Mexico and the Confederacy. As one of Ford's
biographers noted, Ford saw his purpose "to be the nourishment and protection of the Rio
Grande trade and the cultivation of friendly relations with Mexican authority in preparation for
pursuance of that trade during the war emergency" (Lea 1957: 176). The presence of the
Confederate troops in South Texas was thus as much for economic reasons as it was for military
security.
Early in the war, Union leaders recognized that South Texas had become the "back door" of the
Confederacy, and they moved to end the cotton smuggling as soon as they could. The Rio
Grande area military initiatives, including the taking of Brownsville in late 1863, were all part of
Union attempts to wrest control of the Rio Grande and its potential for cotton shipping from the
confederacy. The continued presence of Union troops at Brazos Santiago and at other points
along the South Texas coast was a direct result of the economic importance of the area to the
Confederacy, and accounted for the concentration of Confederate troops in the region. Palmito
Ranch's strategic South Texas location midway between Fort Brown and Brazos Santiago-is
centered fin this important trade zone, which explains why the area had already seen military
combat during the Civil War, and why in May 1865 it again became the scene of intense fighting
between the Union and the Confederacy.
The End of the Civil War
Although General Robert E. Lee officially surrendered his troops to Union General Ulysses S.
Grant on April 5, 1865, in Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia, his announcement did not signal
the absolute conclusion of the war, because each Confederate military department had to achieve
its own separate peace. General Taylor, for example, in charge of Confederate forces in
Mississippi and Alabama, did not surrender his troops to Union General Canby until May 4,
1865 (Schuler 1960: 18). The Texas branch of the Confederacy was part of the Trans- Mississippi
Department (Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and the Indian Territory), that had not surrendered as
of May 12, 1865, the date of the Battle of Palmito Ranch. Several prominent Texans, including
General Magruder and Governor Pendleton Murrah, "vainly exhorted Texas soldiers to continue
the struggle," despite Lee's surrender and the virtual dissolution of the Confederacy (Webb
1952:351).
Thus, by the middle of May 1865, despite the fact that most of the rest of the Confederate Army
had surrendered, both armies still had troops on alert at their respective Texas posts. The Union
troops (who would soon instigate the conflict at Palmito Ranch) remained at Brazos Santiago,
while the Confederates, still retaining control over much of the Rio Grande Valley area,
persevered at Fort Brown at Brownsville. Brigadier General Zachary Taylor established Fort
Brown in 1846 during the Mexican War, directly across the Rio Grande from Matamoros. In the
1860's, under the control of the Confederacy, the fort served as an essential link in the cotton
smuggling operations that Confederate troops oversaw.
Although both the union and Confederacy maintained armed forces at Brazos Santiago and Fort
Brown, respectively, during May 1865, the leaders of both armies realized that, at that late date,
the Civil War was essentially over, and continued fighting in Texas would do little to change the
final outcome of the War. In fact, until the Battle of Palmito Ranch began on May 11, both armies
honored an informal truce agreement negotiated about two months earlier between Union
General Lee Wallace and Confederate commanders General John E. Slaughter and Colonel Rip
Ford.
Wallace, acting on orders from General Grant, came to Brazos Island in February 1865, to
negotiate a peace agreement with the Trans-Mississippi Department of the Confederate Army. In
addition, Grant hoped that Wallace might curtail "the international intrigue and trade at the Rio
Grande" (Schuler 1960: 17). Meeting in conference with Ford and Slaughter at Point Isabel on
March 11, Wallace proposed a settlement of peace between the two sides. According to Ford's
memoirs, Wallace "suggested that it was useless to fight on the Rio Grande, [and] that if the
contending parties met and slaughtered each other it would have no effect on the final result of
the contest" (Ford, quoted in Oates 1963:388). Ford and Slaughter, while in concert with Wallace,
could not formally sign any truce since they lacked the authority to do so from the Confederate
government. They did, however, leave the meeting with the intention of honoring the terms of
the truce, and fully expected the Federals to do the same.
The next day-March 12, 1865-General Wallace sent a letter to Slaughter and Ford specifically
outlining the truce they had discussed earlier. The document, while acknowledging that neither
party had the explicit authority of their respective governments to negotiate a settlement,
nevertheless outlined specific propositions intended "to secure a speedy peace" between the
Union and the Confederate's Trans-Mississippi Department (Wallace 1865:1281). In return for the
Confederates' ceasing all military opposition to the Union, Wallace promised immunity. "The
officers and soldiers at present actually composing the Confederate Army proper...shall have...a
full release from and against actions, prosecutions, liabilities, and legal proceedings of every
kind, so far as the Government of the United States is concerned: Provided...they shall first take
an oath of allegiance to same," Wallace wrote. Further, the agreement guaranteed safe passage to
any Southerners who wished to leave the country rather than take such an oath (Wallace
1865:1281).
Until May 11, 1865, the Union and Confederate forces in South Texas honored the truce, actually
a gentleman's agreement. That day, however, Colonel Theodore H. Barrett, commander of the
Union forces stationed at Brazos Santiago, ordered his troops to advance towards the
Confederate stronghold of Fort Brown. The Federals soon encountered a Confederate outpost,
and fighting erupted. Outraged at the Union transgression, Colonel Ford ordered retaliation, and
the Battle of Palmito Ranch began.
Prior to the Battle
Immediately prior to the battle, Union troops were stationed at Brazos Santiago, as they had
been for much of the Civil War. Although the Union evacuated most of its troops from South
Texas by 1864,, they maintained bases on Brazos Island and Matagorda Peninsula for the
duration of the war to support blockade ships along the Texas coast. Colonel Theodore H. Barrett
of the 62nd U.S. Colored Infantry (U.S.C.I.), who himself had no combat experience prior to the
engagement at Palmito Ranch, was one of the commanding officers stationed on the island, along
with Brigadier-General E.B. Brown (Widener 1992:4). Lieutenant Colonel David Branson, also of
the 62nd, assisted the commanders. The battle accounts of Barrett and Branson possibly provide
the most accurate descriptions of the early stages of the battle, since they were recorded almost
immediately after the conflict- earlier than other accounts which survive today. Branson's
account, in the form of a report to the headquarters of the 62nd, is dated May 18, 1865, just a few
days after the battle, while Barrett's report to the headquarters of the Third Brigade dates to
August 10 of that year.
The Union force on Brazos Santiago consisted of both black and white soldiers, men from the
62nd U.S.C.I. and the Second Texas Cavalry (unmounted). The latter were pro- Union Texas
residents who joined the Federal army at the start of the Civil War. Soon after the battle began,
men from the 34th Indiana Volunteer Infantry (also known as the Morton Rifles), under the
command of Lieutenant- Colonel Morrison, joined these troops. Altogether, the Union Army had
more than 1,500 men in place at Brazos Santiago, although a somewhat smaller number actually
participated in the Battle of Palmito Ranch (Schuler 1960: 1).
Confederate forces at Fort Brown were under the command of Colonel John Salmon (Rip) Ford
and General James E. Slaughter. Ford, mentioned earlier as instrumental in establishing the
clandestine cotton shipping route for the Confederates, was a South Carolina native who came to
Texas in 1836. He served in the Texas Army for two years, and later, from 1847 to 1848, was a
member of the Texas Rangers during the Mexican War. It was during this tour of duty that Ford
earned the name "Rip." Responsible for the writing of condolence letters to the families of
soldiers killed in action, Ford would end all his messages with the words, "May he rest in peace."
After writing hundreds of such letters, Ford began to abbreviate this message "R.I.P." and soon
afterwards he acquired the nickname. In 1849, Ford was made a captain in the Texas Rangers
and patrolled the territory between the Nueces River and Rio Grande. He gained political as well
as military experience as a Texas Ranger, serving as a delegate to the state's Secession
Convention in 1861. That same year, he initiated the trade agreements between Mexico and the
Confederacy that eventually led to the transport of Confederate cotton to European ships via
Mexican-owned wagons and steamboats (Schuler 1960:7-9; Webb 1952:617).
Ford and his superior officer, General Slaughter, had an unusual working relationship according
to several sources, including Ford's own memoirs. Although Slaughter was technically in charge
of the soldiers, Ford actually commanded the troops, and it was he who the troops obeyed and
respected (Schuler 1960:8). Slaughter seemed comfortable with Ford in command. An incident
that occurred in 1864 illustrates the situation: while discussing a plan to attack the Union
stronghold on Brazos Island, Slaughter concluded that the strategy was sound, and suggested
that Ford lead the troops, with Slaughter himself accompanying them merely as an observer.
Ford objected, believing that if the general were going to accompany his troops, he should
command them, as well. Ford's wishes were carried out, although the mission was ultimately
unsuccessful (Ford 1963:386). The episode illustrates Ford's active command over the troops, and
Slaughter's more passive role. Indeed, it would be Ford who soon led the Confederate troops'
effective counterattack in the Battle of Palmito Ranch.
Significantly, the number of Confederate troops based at Fort Brown had shrunk dramatically in
the weeks immediately preceding the encounter at Palmito Ranch. On May 1, 1865, the
Confederates had approximately 500 troops in the Rio Grande area, but two weeks later, by the
time fighting began, they had only about 500 men. Reasons for the decline in Confederate
strength are unclear, although Captain W.H.D. Carrington of Austin, a participant in the battle
who detailed the conflict in his memoirs, suggested that a large number of Confederates deserted
after hearing news of Lee's surrender one month earlier. His account, written in 1883, almost 20
years after the conflict, offered this explanation:
On the 1st of May, 1865, the Confederate troops on the Rio Grande numbered about five
hundred men of all arms. A few days after that time, a passenger, on a steamer from Boca Del
Rio Boca Chica to Brownsville, threw some copies of the New Orleans Times to some
Confederates posted near the Palmetto ranch. These papers stated that Gen. Lee had
surrendered. The news was soon known to all the troops, and caused them to desert, by the
score, and to return home; so that on the morning of the 12th of May, 1865, there were not more
than three hundred men at and below Brownsville (Carrington 1883:20, in Schuler 1960).
Other historians agree with Carrington's figure of 300, but suggest that the decrease in soldiers
was due not only to deserters, but also to a large number of troops on furlough (due to the
presumed truce, and imminent end to the hostilities). Too, some soldiers fled across the Rio
Grande to Mexico to escape capture by a victorious Union Army. Regardless of the reasons, most
sources agree that the Confederates had only about 300 men at Fort Brown on May 12, 1865, far
fewer than the 1,500 Union troops stationed at Brazos Santiago. The Confederate forces appeared
ill prepared for the coming battle in South Texas.
The Battle of Palmito Ranch: May 12 and 13, 1865
The following account of the battle is based principally upon the written accounts of four key
participants: Colonel Barrett's and Lieutenant Colonel Branson's reports mentioned above,
provide the most detailed descriptions of the Union's initial advance towards Palmito Ranch.
The memoirs of Colonel Ford and Captain Carrington of the Confederate Army provide detail
on the Confederate army's counterattack and the last stages of the battle.
On the evening of May 11, 1865, Union Colonel Barrett ordered an expedition of 250 men of the
62nd U.S.C.I., along with 50 men of the Second Texas Cavalry (led by First Lieutenant Hancock
and Second Lieutenant James), all under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Branson, from
Brazos Santiago [A on accompanying map] onto the mainland. Originally ordered to land at
Point Isabel, just northwest of Brazas Santiago across the Laguna Madre, an intense storm
thwarted the expedition and forced the troops to return to camp. Later, at approximately 9:30
p.m., they made the crossing at Boca Chica- a narrow inlet at the south tip of Brazos Island (See
Figure 1). Two six-mule teams hauled surplus ammunition and supplies for the soldiers. Upon
reaching the mainland, the force marched all night, in the direction of Fort Brown.
Early the next morning, at approximately 2:00 a.m.; Branson's troops surrounded White's Ranch
[B], a small settlement west of Palmito Ranch, in hopes of capturing a Confederate outpost. They
discovered, instead, that the outpost had been deserted one or two days prior to their arrival.
Hiding themselves in a thicket of tall weeds, the troops camped out for the rest of the night on
the banks of the river, approximately 1.5 miles above White's Ranch (Benson 1865:268).
About 8:30 a.m., persons on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande spotted the Union camp and
promptly brought the concealed soldiers to the attention of the Confederates. According to
Branson, "At the same time soldiers of the Imperial Mexican Army were marching up that bank
[on the Mexican side] of the river." The Imperial Mexican Army was sympathetic to the
Confederate cause, and its presence no doubt caused concern among the Union soldiers. Branson
continues, "I immediately started for Palmetto Ranch [C], skirmishing most of the way with the
[Confederate's] cavalry, and drove them, at noon, from their camp, which had been occupied by
about 190 men and horses, capturing 3 prisoners, 2 horses, and 4 beef cattle, and their ten days
rations, just issued" (Benson 1865:268). Union soldiers confiscated the supplies and materials
they could carry; they burned the rest.
The Confederate forces with whom Branson's troops skirmished were members of Gidding's
Regiment, under the command of Captain Robinson. Colonel Ford notes in his memoirs that, on
the afternoon of May 12, he received a message from Robinson that "the Yankees had advanced,
and he was engaged with them just below San Martin Ranch." Ford sent a message back to
Robinson urging the captain to hold his ground, and that Ford would bring reinforcements as
soon as possible (Oases 1963:389).
After the brief skirmishing at Palmito Ranch, Branson and his Union troops retreated to the hill
nearby to rest and feed their animals. At approximately 3 p.m., however, the Confederates
appeared with reinforcements. Branson considered the Federals position on Palmito Hill to be
"indefensible," so he led his troops back to White's Ranch for the night, H skirmishing some on
the way" (Benson 1865:268). One member of the Union's Second Texas Cavalry was wounded in
the retreat. At White's Ranch, Branson sent a message to Barrett requesting additional support.
At daybreak the next morning (May 13, 1865), Branson and his men were joined at White's Ranch
by 200 men of the 34th Indiana Volunteer Infantry (also known as the Morton Rifles), under the
command of Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Morrison. Colonel Barrett also joined the troops, and
assumed command of the enlarged Federal force. Barrett, in his report to Confederate
headquarters, recalled his activities that morning:
I at once ordered an advance to be again made in the direction of Palmetto Ranch [E], which,
upon the retirement of Lieutenant-Colonel Branson, had been reoccupied by the rebels. The
enemy's cavalry were soon encountered. Driving them before us, we reached the ranch by 7 or 8
a.m., and again compelled the rebels to abandon it. Such stores as had escaped destruction the
day previous were now destroyed, and the buildings which the enemy had turned into barracks
were burned, in order that they might no longer furnish him convenient shelter. A detachment
was here sent back to Brazos Santiago with our wounded and the prisoners and captures of the
day previous. The remainder of the force was ordered to advance. Nearly the entire forenoon
was spent in skirmishing. The enemy, though taking advantage of e very favorable position, was
everywhere easily driven back (Barrett 1865:266).
Meanwhile, Ford had difficulty organizing the main body of the Confederate troops for battle. "It
would be saying the mere truth to assert that [my] orders found some of the detachments badly
prepared to move" (Oases 1963:389), Ford later wrote in his memoirs. Carrington referred to the
Confederate forces on the night of May 12 as "scattered and depleted," and the situation was little
improved the next morning (Carrington 1883, quoted in Schuler 1960:21). Much of the disarray
can be attributed to the reduced force and ambivalence in the face of imminent defeat (or of Lee's
surrender). Regardless of the cause, Ford's troops were ill prepared for battle, and after receiving
Robinson's request for assistance on the afternoon of the 12, Ford had to act quickly to assemble a
defensive force. Ford noted that, "The artillery horses had to travel the most of the night of the
12th to reach Fort Brown. So had many of the men" (Oases 1963:289). The majority of Ford's
troops would not be ready and in place for battle until late the following afternoon. Ford arrived
on the parade grounds of Fort; Brown on the morning of May 13, 1865, and waited for General
Slaughter to lead the Confederates to battle. Slaughter did not appear, however, and around
10:00 a.m. Ford "placed himself at the head of the troops present and marched to a short distance
below San Martin Ranch" (Oates: 390).
Some Confederate troops had already assembled near Palmito Ranch, however, and it was these
Confederate outposts with whom Barrett's force skirmished in the early afternoon on May 13.
One particularly "sharp" engagement pushed these Confederates west of Tulosa Ranch [F], back
towards Fort Brown. Barrett describes the incident:
In this engagement our forces charged the enemy, compelled him to abandon his cover, and,
pursuing him, drove him across an open prairie beyond the rising ground completely out of
sight. The enemy having been driven several miles since daylight, and our men needing rest, it:
was not deemed prudent to advance farther. Therefore, relinquishing the pursuit, we returned to
a hill [at Tulosa Ranch] about a mile from Palmetto Ranch, where the Thirty-fourth Indiana had
already taken its position (Barrett 1865:266).
Tulosa Ranch is southwest of Palmito Ranch and approximately twelve miles from Boca Chica.
Once at Tulosa, Barrett and his men rejoined the 34th Indiana Volunteer Infantry, who, as Barrett
mentioned in the passage above, anticipated fighting and had already established a skirmish
line. The Union soldiers made preparations for renewed fighting atop the hill.
By about 4:00 p.m., Colonel Ford and his troops concluded their long march from Fort Brown
and had reached a point just below San Martin Ranch [G]. The Union Army at Tulosa Ranch was
in sight, although not yet aware of the Confederates' presence. Ford issued directions for a two
pronged attack:
...Having made reconnaissance and determined to attack, [Ford] directed Captain Jones to place
one section of his battery in the road under Lieutenant Smith, another under Lieutenant William
Gregory on the left, supported by Lieutenant [Jesse] Vineyard's detachment. The other section
was held in reserve. The guns were directed to move in advance of the line. Captain Robinson
was placed in command of the main body of cavalry-Anderson's battalion under Captain D.W.
Wilson on the right by consent, and Giddings' battalion on the left. Lieutenant Gregory had
orders to move under cover of the hills and chaparral, to flank the enemy's right, and if possible
to get an enfilading fire. Captain Gibson's and Cocke's companies were sent to the extreme left
with orders to turn the enemy's right flank. Skirmishers were advanced (Oates 1963: 390).
Once his men were in position, Ford ordered the attack [H].
Thus, on the afternoon of May 13, 1865, Colonel Barrett and the Union troops resting at Tulosa
Ranch abruptly found themselves facing a largely reinforced Confederate Army and a daunting
array of firepower, advancing towards them not only in the front, but also on the right flank, in
an attempt to gain their rear. Along with additional troops, the Confederates now possessed
several cannons, (six, according to Barrett). The Union soldiers prepared for the imminent attack
by forming an oblique skirmish line, extending from the Rio Grande on the Union's left all the
way around the front of the Union forces and stretching back to cover their rear. The heaviest
fighting of the battle commenced.
According to Barrett's account, the Confederates opened fire on the Federals simultaneously
from the front and the side:
...The rebels, now largely re-enforced, again reappeared in our front, opening fire upon us with
both artillery and small-arms,. At the same time a heavy body of cavalry and a section of a
battery, under cover of the thick chaparral on our right, had already succeeded in flanking us
with the evident intention of gaining our rear. With the Rio Grande on our left, a superior force
of the enemy in front, and his flanking force on our right, our situation was at this time
extremely critical. Having no artillery to oppose the enemy's six 12-pounder field pieces, our
position became untenable. We therefore fell back, fighting. This movement, always difficult,
was doubly so at this time, having to be performed under a heavy fire from both front and flank
(Barrett 1865:266).
While the main body of the Union troops fell back, a small number of men (110, according to
Branson) were deployed as skirmishers under the command of Captains Miller and Coffin and
Lieutenants Foster and Mead. The effectiveness of this skirmishing force is uncertain. Branson
recalls that, "They kept the enemy at a respectful distance at all times and did their duty in the
best possible manner" (Benson 1865:268). Ford, however, writes that he "saw the enemy's
skirmishers, which were well handled, left without support by the retreating main body, and he
ordered an advance. Very soon Captain Robinson charged with impetuosity. As was expected
the Yankee skirmishers were captured and the enemy troops were retreating at a run" (Oates
1963:391). Barrett confirmed the capture of some 48 Federal skirmishers (Barrett 1865:266).
Regardless of how well the small number of skirmishers performed their duty to hold off the
Confederates and give Union troops time to retreat and regroup, the Yankees had deployed
simply too few of them to mount an effective challenge to the approaching Confederate troops.
In addition to difficulties the skirmishers faced, the main body of Union troops rapidly broke
into disarray, forced to retreat from an "untenable" defensive position at Tulosa. The 62nd
U.S.C.I. had been ordered to cover the Union forces as they fell back [J], but, according to
Captain Carrington, "Benson's Negro regiment was quickly demoralized and fled in dismay."
Carrington described the Federals' frantic retreat and frustrated attempts to escape superior
Confederate forces:
The Indiana troops [34th Volunteer Infantry] threw down their arms and surrendered; most of
Hancock's company escaped; retreating through the dense chaparral. The entire force of the
Federals commenced to retreat; Ford's fierce cavalry charges harassed them exceedingly. The
artillery moved at a gallop. Three times, lines of skirmishers were thrown out to check the
pursuit; these lines were roughly handled and many prisoners captured (1960:21).
Colonel Barrett, understandably, described the Federals' hasty retreat as occurring in a more
orderly fashion. "The entire regiment fell back with precision and in perfect order, under
circumstances that would have tested the discipline of the best troops. Seizing upon every
advantageous position, the enemy's fire was returned deliberately and with effect. The fighting
continued three hours" (Barrett, 267). As the Union soldiers quickly retreated toward the west,
one group of troops was cut off from any escape route by a bend in the Rio Grande. Some
attempted to escape by dashing around the bend in the river on foot, while others attempted to
cross the river. The Confederates captured or shot many of those who ran, yet most escaped.
Carrington noted the unfortunate fate of some who braved the river crossing: "It is greatly to be
regretted that several who attempted to swim the river to escape capture were drowned. Several
swam across and were immediately slain and stripped by Mexican bandits, and thrown into the
river" (Carrington 1883, quoted in Brown 1962:434).
The Confederates pursued the Union troops in a northeast direction for approximately seven or
eight miles. Ford described their efforts:
Our guns pursued at the gallop; the shouting men pressed to the front. Occupying the hills
adjacent to the road, Confederates fired in security from behind the crests. The enemy
endeavored to hold various points, but were driven from them. The pursuit lasted for seven
miles, the artillery horses were greatly fatigued (some of them had given out), the cavalry horses
were jaded. Ford was convinced the enemy would be reinforced at or near the White House [at
White's Ranch]. For these reasons he ordered the officers to withdraw the men (Oates 1963:391).
The Union troops were driven back to Cobb's Ranch [K], approximately two miles from Boca
Chica, where they could cross over to their base on Brazas Island. Ford then ordered his troops
to halt. Carrington speculated as to why Ford discontinued the pursuit at this critical point,
when the Confederates were so successfully driving the Federals back towards the Gulf Coast:
If Ford had more troops he would doubtless have placed himself between the enemy and Brazos
Island, but with his small force of less than three hundred men, he said "the undertaking would
be too hazardous." He thought the Federals would be reinforced from Brazos Island, as they
knew from the sound of approaching artillery, and from couriers that Barrett [sic] was defeated,
and Ford's force would have been between two bodies of enemies, each numbering as many as
five to one (Schuler 1960:21).
After withdrawing from the pursuit, the Confederates retreated a short distance. At this point,
General Slaughter arrived. According to Ford, Slaughter assumed command and sent a
messenger to Ford directing the colonel to "resume the pursuit." The Federals, at this point,
had commenced to double quick by the left flank across, a slough through which a levee had
been thrown up about three hundred yards long [L]. The slough was an impassable quagmire for
any character of troops except upon the narrow levee. General Slaughter saw the movement and
scarcely pausing for a moment, ordered the pursuit to be resumed; ordering Carrington to press
the rear guard of the enemy. His idea was to strike the rear guard so as to cut it off before
reaching the levee; but the rear guard was in a hurry. Although Carrington's troopers were
comparatively fresh and spurred their horses up nearly to their best running capacity, the enemy
gained the levee when they were about two hundred yards from the main body of the enemy
who had formed a line of battle at the farther end of the levee among the sand hills. Carrington
immediately formed the Confederate troopers into line on the edge of the slough then covered
with tide water. While doing this he saw General Slaughter dash forward into the water in front,
and emptied his six-shooter at the retreating foe. The Federal line formed on the other side of the
slough was three hundred yards, off from the Confederate troopers. A heavy skirmish fire was
kept up for nearly an hour across the slough. The enemy though in full view shot too high. They
were, as we thought, five or six times as numerous as the Confederates (Schuler 1960:22).
Ford himself refused to join the resumed pursuit of the Federals, protesting that the horses were
tired and that the Union would be reinforced when they were within range of Brazos Island. In
his memoirs, he described the above action as a minor coda to the overall Battle of Palmito
Ranch. According to Ford, Slaughter merely sent skirmishers in the Union Army's direction, and
the Federals responded sending out skirmishers of their own. Both sides then engaged in firing-
for "perhaps ten minutes," according to Ford, rather than Carrington's "nearly an hour"-and then
Slaughter withdrew his skirmishers.
Regardless of how long this fighting took place, it undoubtedly occurred at or immediately
following sunset. Most members of the Union Army forged their way back to Boca Chica and
then to Brazos Island. The Confederates also withdrew a short way, with Slaughter announcing
his intention to camp nearby at Palmito for the night. Ford, however, insisting that the Union
Army still might receive reinforcements and return during the night, moved his troops to a point
about "eight miles higher up" (Oates: 392), and encamped there.
That evening, as both armies retreated from the site of the final skirmishing, a shell from a ship
stationed nearby, possibly the S.S. Isabella, exploded between the two armies. According to
Carrington, the noise disturbed "a seventeen year old [Confederate] trooper, [who] blazed away
in the direction of the exploded shell with his Enfield rifle, using a very profane expletive for so
small a boy, causing a hearty laugh from a half score of his comrades. The firing ceased. The last
gun had been fired" (Schuler 1960:22). Although details of this story vary, most accounts contend
that this was the last shot of the Battle of Palmito Ranch and of the last land battle of the Civil
War.
Aftermath of the Battle
Historians still debate the number of casualties for each side. First hand accounts report light
casualties for both armies. Barrett reports 111 Federal casualties total, a number that includes
both killed and wounded men, as well as those the Confederates captured. Rip Ford, in his
handwritten memoirs, recalled that the Confederates sustained only seven wounds and no
deaths during the conflict; all seven men were wounded, he reported, and not killed. However,
Stephen B. Oates, the editor of Rip Ford's Texas-the edited, organized version of Ford's
manuscripts compiled in 1963 believes that about 30 federal troops died and 113 taken prisoner,
from the total fighting force of 800. Oates theorized that the Confederates lost about the same
number, although their total fighting force was considerably smaller (Oases 1963:392).
Many of the casualties of the conflict were not killed or wounded as a direct result of the
fighting. Enemy fire killed or injured a numerous soldiers, mostly from the federal Army, as they
attempted to flee across the Rio Grande. Hostile troops of the imperial Mexican Army confronted
many men who successfully crossed the river. The Mexican Army reputedly killed or robbed the
Union soldiers attempting to escape the conflict.
Not all those who crossed the river were Union soldiers escaping from battle, however.
Confederate general James Slaughter and several men in his command, reportedly upon hearing
of Lee's surrender, themselves crossed the river to Matamoros just prior to the arrival of Union
reinforcements. Once in Mexico, Slaughter conveyed the remaining Confederate military
supplies and artillery under his command to the imperial Mexican Army (Myers 1990:42).
Although the Confederates had won a decisive victory in the battle of Palmito Ranch, the battle
did nothing to change the ultimate outcome of the War. General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the
Texas troops of the Trans- Mississippi Department of the Confederate Army on May 26, 1865,
and the entire Department formally surrendered on June 2, 1865 (Schuler 1960: 18).
A poor showing at Palmito Ranch embarrassed the Union Army, and commanding officers
(perhaps Colonel Barrett) attempted to place some of the blame for the loss on the shoulders of
Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Morrison. The Union Army conducted a court martial in July 1865,
on charges of disobedience of orders, neglect of duty, abandoning his colors and displaying
conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline but acquitted Morrison in September of
that year (Kent 1865:1).
Of the key places and geographic locations important in the battle, only the battlefield area itself
remains relatively unchanged today, due primarily to the fact that the land remains
undeveloped. The marshy soil and unpredictable weather conditions, subject to hurricanes and
frequent storms, combine to create an unstable environment not suited to development. Soldiers
departed from Fort Brown (National Historic Landmark), the Confederate headquarters in Texas
at the time of the battle, for the last time in 1944; today, Texas Southmost College, also known as
University of Texas at Brownsville, owns and occupies the remaining fort buildings. The Union
post during the conflict, Brazos Santiago (National Register 1971), is today abandoned, although
numerous artifacts and remnants of tent stakes, roads, and other remains are uncovered after
heavy storms. A hurricane shortly after the war ended permanently destroyed the once bustling
city of Baghdad, which saw its heyday during the Civil War years as a shipping point for
Confederate cotton.
Theories as to why the Battle Occurred
As stated earlier, General Lee Wallace, along with General Slaughter and Colonel Ford, arranged
a truce between the Texas forces of the Union and Confederate armies during March 1865. Since
both parties apparently negotiated the truce in good faith, it remains unclear what prompted the
Union Army to advance towards Fort Brown in May of that year, instigating the Battle of
Palmito Ranch and clearly violating the truce agreement.
Civil War historians have advanced two theories to explain the Union's actions. The first of these
theories involves Union Colonel Theodore Barrett, and seeks to understand his motives for
launching the attack. Most accounts agree that Barrett instigated the conflict, ordering Union
troops to advance onto the mainland and into direct conflict with the Confederates. Presumably,
Barrett ordered the attack while Brigadier General Brown was absent from Brazos Santiago on
other business. Barrett's motives remain undocumented, however. According to military records,
Barrett himself, unlike Ford, Carrington, Branson, and the other key figures of the battle, had no
prior military experience. The first theory set forth to explain the battle states that Barrett
triggered the conflict out of a personal desire for combat experience. With the end of the Civil
War rapidly approaching-indeed, the news of Lee's surrender may have already reached South
Texas-Barrett perhaps felt that time was growing short for him to gain actual combat experience
that might later prove invaluable if he hoped for advancement in the armed forces. Perhaps
Barett triggered the Battle of Palmito Ranch for personal reasons, hoping that a quick battle
(which the Union should easily have won, owing to their great advantage in number of troops)
would enhance his fledgling reputation as a soldier (Widener 1992:4).
The historian J. Schuler, in his booklet The Last Battle, presented a more plausible theory as to
why the Union descended upon the Confederacy in South Texas. Schuler contends that the
decision to attack came not from Barrett, but from his commanding officer, Brigadier General
E.B. Brown.
The bulging warehouses at Brownsville, with some two thousand bales of cotton earmarked for
consignees in Matamoros, was the primary cause for the breaking of the truce on May 12, by the
federal troops at Brazos Island, then under the command of Brigadier General E.B. Brown.
Brown had been persuaded by the Yankee cotton speculators at Matamoros, anxious to unload
their cotton before the Confederate collapse, that the cotton could be seized by the Federals and
sold as contraband and the rebels at Brownsville would offer no resistance to the capture of the
city and the cotton stored there. The plan took no account of Rip Ford, the man of integrity;, the
man who believed in the pledged work of the Wallace truce (Schuler 1960:18).
According to Schuler, the Union either overestimated the faith the Confederates placed in the
truce agreement, and would therefore not fight even when directly challenged, or else they
underestimated the fighting strength of the troops defending Fort Brown that Rip Ford
commanded. Regardless, the Union's inability to correctly predict the response of the
Confederates to an attack ultimately led to the Union's defeat in the Battle of Palmito Ranch.
There was precedence for southern cotton to be used for strategic purposes in military conflict. In
November of 1863, for example, immediately prior to the imminent Union occupation of Fort
Brown, Confederate General Lee ordered the burning of more than 200 bales of unshipped
cotton stored there, rather than let the precious commodity fall into Union hands. The resulting
fire destroyed all of Fort Brown and much of the surrounding areas of Brownsville (Banks
1983:34). The incident suggests the importance of cotton in the series of South Texas Civil War
bathes fought as much for economic as for military reasons. The Confederacy's shipments of
cotton through South Texas certainly influenced the location of the Battle of Palmito Ranch, and
the immediate presence of stockpiles of cotton in Brownsville in May 1865 perhaps provided the
direct trigger for the Union to launch an attack on the South Texas city, although the Civil War
was essentially finished.
Significance of Palmito Ranch Battlefield
As the site of the last land engagement of the American Civil War, Palmito Ranch Battlefield
holds significance at the national level. Although the most intense fighting of the Civil War
occurred outside Texas, the state was the scene of numerous military conflicts during the War,
most notably those involving Federal attempts to seize control of all or parts of the Gulf Coast
and the Lower Rio Grande region. These Federal initiatives concentrated on blocking Texas
ports, as the South relied on shipping to provide money for the Confederate government.
Palmito Ranch Battlefield was the scene of the last Civil War battle to occur on American soil,
ultimately fought over cotton from Texas and nearby southern states. Western farmers smuggled
their cotton through South Texas, across the Rio Grande, and into Mexico, where sympathetic
Mexicans transported the valuable commodity to the Gulf for eventual shipment to Europe. This
complex, clandestine arrangement proved essential for the Confederacy's war effort, and
brought hard currency (gold) to Confederates west of the Mississippi. The Confederates were
determined to defend this lucrative trade, and they did so at Palmito Ranch. The battle was thus
not only a matter of pride to Colonel Ford and the rest of the Confederate soldiers-it was a
matter of economic security.
Fought more than one month after General Lee's surrender, the battle represented the ongoing
conflict between the Confederacy's Trans-Mississippi Department and the Union Army. The
battle was not important in terms of the number of casualties or territory won or lost; indeed, the
Battle of Palmito Ranch was a victory for the Confederates, although the Union won the war.
However, Palmito Ranch Battlefield represents the final episode of one of the most disruptive,
turbulent periods in United States history and thus qualifies for listing in the National Register
under Criterion A.
Palmito Ranch Battlefield, and the Civil War era ranches and railroad camps within its
boundaries, is also significant under Criterion D. The area contains archeological information
that contributes to an understanding of the settlement of the Lower Rio Grande valley at the time
of the Civil War. Artifacts present also attest to the economic conditions of the Palmito Ranch
community during the mid to late 19th century. Study of the types of military-related artifacts
preserved on Palmito Ranch Battlefield, and their spatial distribution, may provide direct data
on the character of the engagement, the exact location of the various skirmishes, and the lines of
Union and Confederate fire.
The battlefield has been used for ranching since 1865, as it was in the years prior to the battle.
Major geographical and topographical features are intact. The integrity of the archeological
resources, as well as the integrity of the entire battlefield, has thus been preserved. The landscape
visible today is much the same as that the Union and Confederate soldiers experienced as they
faced each other in battle.
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48. Palo Alto Battlefield
 
Resource
Name: Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site
Address: 6.3 mi. N of Brownsville at jct. of FR 1847 and 511
County: Cameron
City: Brownsville
Narrative: The Palo Alto Battlefield has not changed materials since 1846. It is still a flat land now broken by
a few pasture fences. It has a light duty road (Old Port Isabell Road), a couple of unimproved
roads, drainage ditches and a buried pipe line. Most of the underbrush has been eradicated for
pasturage.
On May 8, 1846, the first major engagement of the Mexican War was fought at Palo Alto. Three
thousand and three hundred Mexican soldiers under General Manuel Arista opposed the
passage into Mexico of General Zachary Taylor and 2,300 United States troops. The Mexican
Army attacked and were repelled twice; they then retreated to Resaca de Guerrero (Resaca de la
Palma). Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma (fought the next day) were the largest and most
important Mexican War battles fought on U.S. soil. Palo Alto was the first American victory in
the war with Mexico. Combined with the Battle of Resaca de la Palma the next day, which was
also a defeat for the Mexican Army, this resulted in the successful invasion of Mexico,
demonstrated the superiority of American arms, heightening of the prestige of the United States
at home and abroad, and finally the addition of vast amounts of territory to the United States.
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49. Port of Brownsville
 








At Brownsville Navigation Dist., SE corner of FM 511 and SH 48 (on FM 511), Brownsville.
Marker Text: The first serious attempt to study the possibility of construction of a deep water seaport in
this part of South Texas was undertaken in 1854 when a survey was conducted by United
States Army engineers. At that time, the only natural harbor in the area was located at
Brazos de Santiago Pass near Point Isabel (16 mi. NE). Shipping through that pass dated to
the 16th Century, but the presence of shifting sandbars prevented large vessels from
anchoring at that point. In 1906 Louis Cabolini, a commercial fisherman in Point Isabel, took
on the cause for a deep water port. He compiled data that convinced U.S. Army engineers
that such an undertaking was practical and deserved federal economic support. During the
next 20 years, various attempts at dredging channels and eliminating the sandbars were
made without much success. Recognizing the need for deep water transportation to assure
sound economic growth, the citizens of Brownsville created a navigation district in 1929 to
provide local support for the Federal Government to build a deep water port. Between 1934
and 1936, this ship channel, linking Brownsville and the Gulf of Mexico, was dredged. The









Designations: Recorded Texas Historic Landmark
Marker
Location: Admin. Bldg., campus of Texas Southmost College, 80 Fort Brown, Brownsville.
Marker Text: In March 1868, Captain William Alonzo Wainwright arrived in Brownsville to supervise the
rebuilding of Fort Brown following the Civil War and an 1867 hurricane. One of the first
structures built under his direction was the Post Hospital, completed in 1869 and noted for
its classical design and Palladian influences. First Lt. William C. Gorgas began studies that
led to the discovery of the source of yellow fever while he was based here in 1883.
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51. Post Hospital Annex
 





Designations: Recorded Texas Historic Landmark
Marker
Location:
Admin. Bldg., Campos of Texas, Southmost College, 80 Fort Brown, Brownsville.
Marker Text: Completed in 1869 during the rebuilding of Fort Brown by Captain William Alonzo
Wainwright, the Post Hospital Annex (also known as the Medical Laboratory), was
constructed to house personnel assigned to work in the nearby Post Hospital. A finely
crafted, classically influenced building, it subsequently was used as a medical laboratory, for
storage purposes, and as a dispensary.
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Designations: Recorded Texas Historic Landmark
Marker
Location: At Market Square and E. 11th Street, Brownsville.
Marker Text: Authorized 1850. On land deeded forever for this purpose. Butchers, other vendors moved
in during 1851. Building complete with top story and bell tower, 1852. Town hall over
market used for Presbyterian church services. In high wind of 1867 lost its second floor.
Restored 1868. Remodeled 1912, 1948. Original foundations and walls still survive in the
modern market.
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53. Resaca de la Palma Battlefield
 
Resource
Name: Resaca de la Palma Battlefield





Narrative: Today the Resaca battlefield merely suggests conditions as they were in 1846. The bend of
the Resaca, once dense with chaparral of mesquite and cactus has been cleared, and until
recently was planted as a citrus orchard. This has been removed and is now an open field
used for polo. The outlying areas are heavily developed residentially, losing completely
any remaining historical integrity. At least the Resaca de la Palma, once filled in has been
excavated and again contains water. The tall palms that suggested the name of the Resaca
are still standing. A Texas Centennial Commission monument marks the site, but a cannon
placed by General James Parker during 1920-21 has been removed about 1/2 mile north of
the site. The intrusions are so great that no attempt at preservation is possible. The only
remaining open space, although it no longer retains original landscape features is the major
portion of the active battlefield and serves well in a commemorative function.
The battle of Resaca de la Palma was one of only two important battles of the Mexican War
fought on what is now American soil. Following the Mexican retreat from the Battle of Palo
Alto on May 8, General Zachery Taylor and his army followed them to the Resaca de la
Palma, where fighting resumed. Deploying his infantry through the chaparral and sending
his cavalry on a sudden charge down the road, Taylor captured enemy artillery and caused
the foot soldiers to withdraw. With heavy losses in artillery and personnel, the Mexican
army retreated across the Rio Grande. These events led to the successful invasion of
Mexico, demonstrating the superiority of American arms which gained the United States
new prestige at home and abroad. History
Early in 1846, General Zachery Taylor received orders to take possession of the territory
lying between the Nueces and Rio Grande Rivers. Accordingly, he started southward with
a part of his force from Corpus Christi overland sending his supplies and munitions by
boat. After a difficult march across the vast territory, the Army encamped on March 24,
1846, near Los Fresnos, ten miles north of the present Brownsville, remaining four days
while supplies were brought from Point Isabel. On March 28 they reached the Rio Grande
where they began construction of earthworks directly on the banks of the river. The post
was first known as Fort Taylor but was renamed Fort Brown in honor of Major Jacob
Brown who was fatally wounded on May 9 when the fort was besieged by Mexican troops
from Matamoros.
Movement of the American army south from Corpus Christi had been the signal for the
concentration of Mexican troops at Matamoros. General Arista was appointed Mexican
Commander-in-Chief to supersede General Pedro Ampudia, with a total of 5,200 regulars
and 26 pieces of artillery. General Arista moved the concentration of the Mexican cavalry at
Rancho Soliseno, 26 miles west of Matamoros with a view of cutting off Taylor's supplies.
He crossed from Soliseno on April 24 and took a position on the Point Isabel road new
Loma Alta, 9 miles north of Brownsville. Upon hearing of the move, Taylor, with his entire
force except for some 50 men remaining at Fort Brown, left on May 1 for the coast, arriving
at Point Isabel on May 5. Believing that Taylor was about to withdraw entirely, the
Mexicans crossed from Longoreno on May 1 in pursuit of Taylor, leaving a force to besiege
the fort. Taylor having received new of the Mexican movement, departed from Point Isabel
on May 7. On the following day the Americans and Mexicans confronted each other on the
Battlefield of Palo Alto.
After each army was unable to advance, the Mexicans retired southward during the early
hours of May 9 and made a stand at Resaca Guerrero, since known as Resaca de la Palma.
Here they planted three cannons and the greater part of their infantry on the north banks of
the Resaca. Supporting these were four cannons on the south side of the Resaca, distributed
on each side of the road from Point Isabel, with the remainder of the infantry planted on
the bank on the Resaca.
The cavalry was distributed along the western turn of the Resaca and a body called
"Defensores de Tampico" was hidden in the woods west of the old road which ran south
from the Resaca Rancho Viejo in the direction of Brownsville. In front and to the north of
the position taken by the Mexicans there was a praire about three miles in length, thickly
covered with sacahuiste or wire grass. To the west, along the road on both sides, there was
also a dense growth of ebony, mesquite, and other native cover. The artillery, which had
been so effective the previous day, was greatly impeded in its progress by the wire grass.
Realizing that artillery alone could not dislodge the enemy, General Taylor ordered
Captain May of the Dragoons to charge the position. This was done successfully and the
Mexican army quickly retreated. General Arista narrowly escaped captured, his tent and
all his personal effects falling into the hands of the Americans. His force fled toward the
Rio Grande while all the Mexican artillery and supplies fell into the hands of the victorious
Americans.





Marker Title: Russell-Cocke House





Designations: Recorded Texas Historic Landmark
Marker Text: Built in 1877 for Judge William H. Russell (1838-1882), this house was purchased by
Virginian and Confederate veteran Joseph James Cocke (1841-1926) in 1885. The Cocke
family continued to live in the home until the late 1940s. The eclectic Victorian house
displays Italianate and Greek Revival influences in such features as its Classical proportion
and massing and its bracketed porch supports. Its most distinguishing feature is a distinctive
large pedimented dormer and door with transom. The 1975 restoration of this house spurred
preservation efforts in the neighborhood. Recorded Texas Historic Landmark-2000
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55. Sabas Cavazos Cemetery
 








Location: From Brownsville, take US 281 west about 4 miles.
Marker Text: Established in 1878 with the burial of rancher and businessman Sabas Cavazos, this small
cemetery has served the Cavazos and related families for more than a century. It is located
within the Portrero de Don Sabas Cavazos, a portion of the Espiritu Santo land grant
conveyed to Jose Salvador de la Garza by the King of Spain in 1781. Born December 4, 1809,
in Camargo, Nuevo Santander, Mexico, Sabas Cavazos was the son of Jose Maria Francisco
Cavazos and Estefana Goseascochea, and a great-grandson of Jose Salvador de la Garza.
Encompassing more than one-quarter million acres of land, the Espiritu Santo Grant
included the future sites of Fort Brown and the City of Brownsville. The de la Garza Family
established Rancho Viejo, the first settlement in the Brownsville area. The communities of
San Pedro, El Carmen, La Gloria, and La Puerta were established by Dona Estefana.
Although in use since 1878, the cemetery was not officially recorded in deed records until
1947. Among those buried here are members of the extended Cavazos Family, their relatives,
and members of the San Pedro Community. The site is maintained by descendants of
persons buried here.
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56. Sacred Heart Catholic Church
 
Marker Title: Sacred Heart Catholic Church





Designations: Recorded Texas Historic Landmark
Marker Text: Sacred Heart Church was established by the Oblates of Mary Immaculate for the English-
speaking parishioners of Immaculate Conception Church. San Antonio architect Frederick B.
Gaenslen designed this building for the new congregation in the Gothic Revival style.
Dedicated in 1913, the structure served Sacred Heart until 1967, when parish boundaries
were redrawn and it became a chapel of Immaculate Conception Cathedral. With its tall bell
towers and pointed-arch stained glass windows, Sacred Heart is a noteworthy part of
Brownsville's architectural history. Recorded Texas Historic Landmark - 2001
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57. San Roman Building
 





Designations: Recorded Texas Historic Landmark
Marker
Location: 1245 E. Elizabeth Street, Brownsville.
Marker Text: Erected 1850 for Don Jose San Roman, native of Biscay, Spain--importer, steamboat owner,
merchant, investor in city lots. He and successor, Feliciano San Roman, backed the Rio
Grande Railroad. Fulgencio Lopez was last of San Romans in charge here.
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58. Southern Pacific Railroad Passenger Depot
 
Southern Pacific RR Passenger Depot
 
Resource
Name: Southern Pacific Railroad Passenger Depot
Address: 601 E. Madison St.





Narrative: An excellent example of Spanish Colonial Revival architecture in Texas, the Southern Pacific
Depot was designed by the Chief Engineer of the Southern Pacific Railway in 1928.
Construction was completed in 1929. It stands almost isolated at the intersection of East Sixth
and East Madison Streets in Brownsville. The light colored stuccoed, one-story, rectangular
building displays good examples of cast stone ornamentation at the major entrances, the
cornice, on the coped parapet at the gabled end, and at the chimney and its adjacent parapet.
The roof is red clay mission tile.
The entrance facade facing southwest is a 12 bay design with some arched openings
denoting the prior existence of an open waiting area and now enclosed with plaster walls.
The remaining window and door openings are rectangular with cast stone surrounds. The
southwest entrance pavilion has a parapet embellished with an elaborate cast stone cornice
and urns, and is topped by the raised central arched parapet. The main entrances are two
pairs of wooden doors flanked by engaged columns that support an architrave, urns, and a
decorative railing. Above the architraves are two casement windows with cast stone
surrounds. In the center between the parapet openings is a large window with side lights
and an arched transom. Set above is an ornate cast stone apron supporting an iron balcony.
This simulated iron balcony has a small arched window above with elaborate cast stone
surrounds and is placed just below the central arch.
The central portal at the southeast facade has elaborate cast stone ornaments consisting of
double engaged spiral columns, an architrave, urns, and a circular window.
Dominating the structure's silhouette is an arched parapet and adjacent stuccoed and tile
roofed chimney. The parapet is pierced by arched openings.
The main interior spaces consist of waiting rooms, plus the baggage room at one end. The
open waiting areas behind the arches are now enclosed. Interior finishes include tile floors
and wainscoting, plaster walls, stenciled beams in the waiting room, wood trimmed
windows, doors and ticket counter and decorative tile around the drinking fountain.
In addition to the enclosed waiting areas along the northeastern and southeastern sides of
the building, other modifications include the removal of 400 foot long concrete train shed
that extended to the northeast along the tracks and a baggage loading platform.
The Southern Pacific Depot in Brownsville a fine example of a Spanish Colonial Revival
structure and symbolizes the-importance of the railroad to the economic development of
Brownsville and the Lower Rio Grande Valley. Brownsville is the largest city in the thriving
semi- tropical region at the southern tip of Texas. The Depot's isolated position and its design
make it one of Brownsville's most outstanding Landmarks. The architectural style is
reminiscent of the 18th Century Spanish settlement of South Texas.
Although railroads had been planned for this region of the South, during the Civil War
shipments of cotton through Texas to Mexico and the Gulf via Brownsville had to rely on
other means of transportation. In 1871 the first railroad, the Rio Grande Railway, came into
Brownsville. Later, the St. Louis, Brownsville, and Mexico Railroad was extended. It was
allowed by the San Benito and Rio Grande Valley Railway in 1912 and the San Antonio and
Aransas Pass Railway in 1927. These railroads served the agricultural markets, that were
thriving due to extensive irrigation, as well as an international trade stimulated by the
development of Port Brownsville.
Missouri Pacific was already established in Brownsville when Southern Pacific acquired the
charter for the San Antonio and Aransas Pass Railway in 1925. This event, appropriately
celebrated, became significant to the development of the Valley. Attended by VIPs from the
Railway, the celebration was a part of the first annual South Texas Chamber of Commerce
Convention and the day was declared Southern Pacific Day. Southern Pacific also brought in
the special track laying machine which made possible the rapid expansion of its railway
system into this area. The first train arrived in Brownsville, November 10, 1927.
Southern Pacific and the Missouri Pacific Railroads are joined to the Mexican National
Railway in Matamoros, just across the Rio Grande River.
The structure was used as a depot until 1952, when it was erected to the Gulf Pacific Cotton
Agency for warehouse and office space. The City of Brownsville is negotiating to purchase
the depot and adapt it for reuse.
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Resource
Name: Stillman, Charles, House






Narrative: In the 1850's the residence at 1305 E, Washington Street was built for Charles Stillman. This
one story home is one of the earliest Greek Revival brick structures built in Brownsville.
Located in the midst of the central business district, the house is built on a brick foundation
into which metal grille vents are incorporated. The house is constructed of common bond
pink brick with wood framed floor and roof construction. A flat-roofed porch, supported by
four large round plastered columns, crosses the entire front facade, A simple wood
balustrade extends between the columns across the front and the corner column and the wall
on the ends. Simple square balusters are supported by a bottom rail raised off the floor and
capped with a plain wood rail. The columns, balustrade, and balusters are all painted white.
The house, which is five bays wide, has a gabled roof of slate shingles and is surrounded by
a boxed white wooden cornice. There is an inside end chimney on each gable end of the front
side of the ridge. Flush with the face of the wall, the chimneys extend up to an arched brick
hood. Another chimney, located on the end wall of the kitchen, extends up to a four step
brick course cap.
The window treatment on the house consists of wood framed, single-hung apertures. The
windows have six-over-six light sashes with wooden sills and lintels There are wooden
adjustable louver shutters painted dark green.
In an L shape, the Stillman House has a floor plan based on a large central hall. The main
entrance, located on the center axis of the front facade, is a wood panel door flanked by side
lights on each side. The side lights have a lower wooden panel topped by twenty-one lights.
The transom, setting above a deep lintel, has twenty-one lights also. The interior flooring is
of wide wooden boards, walls and ceilings are of painted plaster Some rooms have cornices
formed by picture moldings; circular ceiling medallions can also be found on several rooms.
On the right side of the center hall are the parlor, dining room, and study. There are doors on
the northeast walls of the parlor and dining room connecting the three rooms. A fireplace,
with a simple wooden mantelpiece and concrete hearth is found in the parlor. At the left of
the center hall, opposite the parlor is the bedroom. The bedroom itself is distinguished by a
wallpaper frieze forming a cornice.
Following the bedroom, a small display room is found which joins a large display room. All
rooms open on the center hall At the end of the hall, opposite the main entrance, is a double
wood panel door with eighteen light transom above and wood surrounds which opens onto
a small garden and patio. The large display room opens onto a small kitchen with a large
brick fireplace with raised hearth for cooking. Flooring in the kitchen consists of hexagonal
clay tile.
Around the front and part way around the sides extends an iron fence mounted on a brick
sill. A raised brick well is found in the gardens near the kitchen A brick carriage house is
found at the rear of the house. Living quarters are located in the corner of the carriage house.
The quarters are inaccessible.
The Charles Stillman House, circa 1850, is one of the oldest residences in Brownsville. This
fine small scale Greek Revival structure was built as the home of Charles Stillman, owner
and developer of the original townsite of Brownsville. Thomas Carson, agent for the Stillman












Location: From Las Rucias, take US 281 west 2 miles to roadside park.
Marker Text: The spot where "American blood was shed on American soil" April 25, 1846; here Captain
Seth B. Thornton and 62 dragoons were attacked by Mexican troops.
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